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Introduction 
It is not difficult to find, in Ireland, traces of what David Garland would call the 
"crime complex". Such phenomena include the politicisation of law and order, 
increases in maximum sentences, prison expansionism, the curtailment of 
judicial discretion in certain circumstances, legislative control of groups such as 
convicted sex offenders, a developing pro-victim/witness momentum, and the 
increased dissociation of the offender from the state and society. It is also true, 
however, that many of the phenomena outlined are surface events which are not 
yet constitutive of a new penal order in Ireland. They remain largely peripheral 
rather than governing principles of the criminal justice system. It still remains to 
be seen whether such phenomena will develop into a new structural pattern of 
control or will be marginalized. 
It is possible also, however, to unearth stronger evidence of a possible 
drift towards a new trajectory of punishment and a more punitive "logics of 
action." Alongside developments such as "truth in sentencing," the system has 
also witnessed increased calls for "truth in procedure" and "truth in evidence.'" 
The expanding powers of law enforcement and prosecutorial agencies is part of 
a long-term, often unnoticed, shift in the civil liberties landscape, to one more 
closely aligned with the state's result oriented needs and its desire to control 
more effectively.2 As one of the leading commentators on criminal procedure in 
Ireland recently noted: "The heavy emphasis on due process values which 
imposed a heavy burden on the State to prove guilt against a passive defendant-
has been replaced by a model in which, at the very least, the State can coerce a 
much greater degree of co-operation from the suspect, both directly and 
indirectly, in the investigation of his or her own guilt than had been the case 
previously."3 
Curiously, however, and apart from recognising the general decline in 
respect for the rights of offenders particularly as it related to notification and 
expungement laws, Garland had little to say about such a reorientation in 
criminal procedure. This is surprising given that many of the characteristics of 
this alteration in emphasis on due process are consistent with his culture of 
control thesis. For example, procedural laws that steadily encroach upon the 
traditional civil liberty rights of offenders are invariably the product of 
politicised crime control; feed into the notion that offenders are rational 
maximisers; are often justified on the basis of the "otherness" of the criminals 
1 M. Feeley and K. Levine, "Assaults on the Adversarial Process: Rethinking American Criminal 
Justice," Punishment and Society 3(4) (2001): pp. 537-545. 
2 For a fuller discussion, see S. Kilcommins, I. O'Donnell, E. O'Sullivan, and B. Vaughan, Crime. 
Punishment and the Search for Order in Ireland (Institute of Public Administration, 2004), chapter 4. 
3 D. Walsh, Criminal Procedure (Round Hall, Sweet and Maxwell, 2002), xii. 
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targeted; expand the powers of the "sovereign command" in the criminal 
domain whilst also working in the "civil" arena; often have a reassuring, 
retaliatory character; and legitimate themselves by focusing populist attention 
on the crime and on the victims of such crime.· 
Indeed the strongest evidence of the possibility of a drift towards a 
control model of justice in Ireland is manifest in the dissolution of fairness of 
procedure safeguards. If anything, it could be said that in terms of a devaluation 
in due process values, Ireland is now a lodestar for other jurisdictions. This 
marks a complete reversal in Ireland's usual practice of criminal justice policy 
imitation from other western countries. Much, though not all, of the impetus for 
the tooling down of accused/offender rights must be construed against a 
backdrop of the "extra-ordinary" circumstances posed by the conflict in Northern 
Ireland. The "proportionate", "emergency" legal responses drawn up to combat 
the threat posed by paramilitaries have proved remarkably malleable in 
adjusting to more normal circumstances. For Ireland, at least, justifying the need 
for extra-ordinary powers by virtue of supposedly exceptional circumstances 
has obscured the trade-off that has taken place between enhanced public 
protection, on the one hand, and the commitment to due process values on the 
other. It did so by affirming that securities were being enhanced and denying 
that democratic values were being sacrificed - because the powers only worked 
in exceptional circumstances. And then the process of normalisation was 
obscured through a series of small steps, often with "judicial imprimatur."5 In 
times of penal crisis, the result-orientated potential of these extra-ordinary 
provisions quickly looked attractive to the authorities. Indeed they have come to 
be seen as an efficient means of investigating and prosecuting serious, though 
ordinary, crimes, (not least through the ways in which extra-ordinary provisions 
neatly side-step any constitutional due process concerns). 
The purpose of this article is to highlight the various means by which 
extra-ordinary laws have "trickled down" into the ordinary criminal justice 
system, facilitating the creation of a discretionary two tiered system of justice. 
We detail five sites where this normalisation of anti-paramilitary legislation and 
practice has occurred. These are: 
• the manner in which the Gardaf gather information. 
• their use of extra-ordinary arrest provisions for ordinary offences. 
• the use of a non-jury court for ordinary offences (despite the 
constitutional right to a jury trial). 
• the impetus provided by extra-ordinary provisions in respect of seizing 
the proceeds of crime in the ordinary domain. 
• the apathy that exists in respect of the use of supergrass testimony for 
ordinary offences. 
Though much of the normalisation process has taken place against a backdrop 
of Ireland's particular history in the twentieth century, there are lessons for 
4 The murder of journalist Veronica Guerin, for example, acted to some extent as a catalyst for the 
enactment of a spate of punitive legislative measures which have had consequences for procedural 
safeguards. 
, C. Fennell, The Law of Evidence in Ireland (Butterworths, 2003), p. 23. 
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many western countries now attempting to grapple with anti-terrorist laws in a 
post 9111 milieu. First, emergency laws invariably remain longer on the statute 
books than the exigencies of the situation require. Secondly, they will find their 
way into the operation of the "ordinary" criminal justice system as their "truth 
seeking" effectiveness becomes apparent and they will be employed against 
non-terrorist targets. As the discretionary two tiered system of justice advances, 
it becomes increasingly difficult to tell the dancer from the dance. Thirdly, the 
extra-ordinary or emergency provisions will eventually act as a yardstick for the 
public against which it can measure its ability to counteract the threat posed by 
other demonised, non-terrorist, pariahs. The message that these are "extra-
ordinary" or "emergency" provisions gets lost in the clamour to draw perfunctory 
parallels between the threat posed by terrorists and that posed by particular 
groupings of "ordinary" criminals.6 
The Normalisation Process 
The 1937 Constitution of Ireland provides for the establishment of special 
criminal courts where it is found that the ordinary courts are "inadequate to 
secure the effective administration of justice, and the preservation of public 
peace and order" (Art. 38.3). Rather than exercising this function at particular 
times through the introduction of dedicated legislation, the Government of the 
day introduced general enabling legislation in the form of the Offences Against 
the State Act, 1939. 
The first four parts of the Act are permanently in force. For example, 
Part II deals inter alia with offences against the state such as the usurpation of 
the functions of government, obstruction of government, obstruction of the 
President, unauthorised military exercises, and the possession treasonable and 
seditious documents. Part III contends with membership of unlawful 
organisations. Part V, which makes provision for the establishment of the 
Special Criminal Court and the power of the government to schedule offences, 
only comes into operation when the government makes the appropriate 
proclamation that the ordinary courts are inadequate to secure the effective 
administration of justice and the preservation of public peace and order. In 
making such proclamations under Part V, the government does not have to 
explain to the Dail (the Irish equivalent of the House of Commons) why such 
draconian measures are deemed necessary. The necessary proclamations under 
Part V of the 1939 Act have been made for the periods 1939-1946, 1961 to 
1962, and 1972 to date. The current proclamation can be annulled only by a 
resolution of the D:iil or when the government issues a proclamation declaring 
that Part V is no longer in force. 
These measures were intended primarily to be directed at paramilitary 
organisations such as the Irish Republican Army. This legislative framework has 
two important features. The fact that the government never has to give a 
justificatory reason for its belief that ordinary criminal procedures are 
inadequate surely encourages a degree of flexibility in the deployment of 
6 See P. Hillyard, "The Normalisation of Special Powers: From Northern Ireland to Britain", in Law, 
Order and the Authoritarian State ed. P. Scraton (Open University, 1987), pp. 279-312. 
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emergency powers. And the fact that such powers existed surely exercises a 
powerful temptation for officers of the law to deploy them in a wide variety of 
circumstances. The degree of tranquillity with which the general population has 
accepted such repressive measures has been explained by the reduction in 
personal liberties occasioned by the military and civil strife in Ireland in the 
first half of the twentieth century.7 In the sections below, we argue that there has 
been a similar process of habituation to extraordinary legislation. 
(i) Garda{ holding and information gathering tactics 
To begin with, one can refer to the increasing normalisation of extraordinary 
paramilitary legislation by examining the overspill of extraordinary detention 
provisions into the ordinary criminal justice realm. For example, up to 1979, the 
Garda! had on occasion utilised the tactic of "holding suspects for questioning" 
for ordinary offences. This ploy acted as a "useful" information gathering 
technique and it meant that the suspects did not need to be promptly produced 
before the courts as they were not de jure under arrest. In that year, however, the 
Supreme Court held that this practice constituted a de Jacto arrest and 
represented an unlawful invasion of constitutional rights. In The People (DPP) 
v. o 'Loughlin, O'Higgins, c.J. explained: '''Holding for questioning' and 
'taking into custody' and 'detaining' are merely different ways of describing the 
act of depriving a man of his liberty. To do so without lawful authority is an 
open defiance of Article 40, s.4. sub-s.lof the Constitution."8 Following the 
decision, the Garda!, for a number of years, began to resort to the stratagem of 
arresting persons suspected of committing serious crime under section 30 of the 
Offences Against the State Act 1939 (which then permitted a maximum period 
of detention of up to 48 hours),9 an extraordinary piece of legislation designed, 
as detailed above, primarily to combat subversive activities and political 
violence. According to Hogan and Walker, the number of persons so arrested, 
increased dramatically between 1979 (l,431 persons) and 1984 (2,216), the 
year in which the Criminal Justice Act authorised a maximum period of 
detention of 12 hours for ordinary offences punishable by a term of 
imprisonment of five years or more. IO Indeed the same authors suggest that most 
persons wanted for serious crime -subversive in nature or otherwise - during 
this period were arrested and detained under section 30 of the 1939 Act. 
7 E. O'Halpin, Defending Ireland: The Irish State and its Enemies since 1922 ( Oxford University 
Press, 1999). 
• (1979)I.R. 85. See also The People (DPP) v. Shaw (1982) I.R. I where such Garda practices were 
described as "no more than a euphemism for false imprisonment." See also The People v Finnerty 
[I999)41R 364 at 377-378. 
, The Offences Against the State (Amendment) Act in 1998, introduced following the Omagh 
bombing, increased this maximum period of detention to 72 hours. 
10 The relevant provision of the Act, section 4, did not, however, come into operation until 1987, a 
year in which 2,854 persons were arrested under section 30. G. Hogan, and C. Walker, Political 
Violence and the Law in Ireland (Manchester University Press, 1989), pp. 180-181; See also Report 
of the Committee to Review the Offences Against the State Acts, 1939 to 1998, and related matters 
(Stationery Office, 200 I), para 7.12 which noted: "While the provisions of that legislation [the 1939 
Act) was intended to afford the Gardai specific powers in cases where the security of the State was 
threatened, they were routinely applied in cases of which came to be described as 'ordinary crime'. 
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Moreover, and as the UN Human Rights Committee and the Committee 
to Review the Offences Against the State Acts recently pointed out, the manner 
in which section 30 was employed was also a cause for concern, particularly as 
it related to the disparity between persons arrested and those subsequently 
charged. In 1981, for example, 2,303 people were arrested but only 323 were 
charged with an offence. In 1982 the figures were 2,308 arrested (256 charged); 
in 1983, 2,334 (363 charged); in 1984, 2,216 (374 charged); in 1985, 1,834 (366 
charged); and in 1986, 2,387 (484 charged).11 This disparity lead to the 
Committee to Review the Offences Against the State Acts to suggest that a 
further safeguard should be introduced to prevent section 30 being misapplied, 
namely that the Garda! be placed under a statutory duty to release a suspect 
detained under section 30 if it became clear that there were no reasonable 
grounds for continued detention. 12 
The ability of the Garda! to switch, virtually unimpeded, from ordinary 
to extra-ordinary detention procedures - bearing in mind the extensiveness of 
the latter - in respect of suspects accused of ordinary, though serious, offences 
demonstrates, to some extent, the ambivalent culture that exists in Ireland 
regarding individual liberty safeguards. This is particularly so when one 
considers that the extra-ordinary provisions which legitimate such extensive 
detention periods without charge were initially designed only "with actions and 
conduct calculated to undermine the security of the State" in mind. 13 The 
Offences Against the State Act 1939 itself was introduced, as noted, at the 
commencement of the Second World War to combat the threat posed to the state 
by the IRA.14 Despite the signing of the Good Friday Agreement in 1998, which 
is dependent on the maintenance of paramilitary ceasefires and decommissioning, 
and which "looks forward to a normalisation of security arrangements and 
practices," the Irish government has demonstrated no willingness to remove the 
extraordinary laws put in place to counteract such violence. 
(ii) Extra-ordinary measures and non-paramilitary activity 
This overspill from the paramilitary realm into the ordinary realm is also 
evident in the Supreme Court's sanctioning of the wider use of the 
extra-ordinary powers of arrest and detention permitted under section 30 
of the Offences Against the State Act 1939. Under section 30 of the Act, a 
member of the Garda! is authorised to arrest any person suspected of the 
commission of an offence under the 1939 Act or an offence which is 
"scheduled." Section 36 of the Offences Against the State Act 1939 empowers 
the government to declare offences to be scheduled whenever it is satisfied that 
the ordinary courts are inadequate to secure the effective administration of 
11 Report of the Committee to Review the Offences Against the State Acts, para. 7.14. These are the 
only years for which such figures are available. 
"Ibid, para, 7.17. 
" See the long title to the Offences Against the State Act 1939. For a different view, see People 
(DPP) v. Quilligan [1986]1.R. 495. 
" The introduction of emergency law was authorised by Article 28.3 of the Irish Constitution which 
empowers the Oireachtas to introduce emergency legislation at a time of "war, armed conflict, or 
armed rebellion." 
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justice. IS As noted, a suspect arrested under section 30 may be detained for an 
initial period of 24 hours followed by a further 24 hours provided a certain 
direction is given. 16 Section 30 itself is very broad and permits a Garda to arrest 
anyone whom he or she suspects of "having committed, or being about to 
commit, or being or having been concerned in the commission of an offence," 
or "having information in relation to the commission or intended commission" 
of any offence under the 1939 Act or a scheduled offence. There is no specific 
requirement that the Garda must show some reasonable basis for his or her 
suspicion. The section, in effect, has the potential to be a "power of preventative 
detention."17 
In the case of DPP v. Quilligan,18 for example, the defendants were 
suspected of breaking into the home of two elderly brothers, as a result of 
which both brothers had been injured, one fatally, and damage had been done to 
their property. The offences committed were not political or subversive in 
nature. At the time of the offences, malicious damage to property was a 
scheduled offence. Both defendants, accordingly, were arrested and detained 
under section 30 on suspicion of malicious damage which had been caused to a 
door and some furniture at the home of the victims. Whilst so detained, both 
defendants made incriminating statements regarding the more serious, though 
non-scheduled, offence of murder. The trial judge, however, held that the 
considerations which prompted the introduction of the 1939 Act related to 
crimes of a subversive nature which threatened the security of the state. As no 
subversive elements attached to the crimes in issue, the arrest and detention of 
the defendants was held to be illegal, and a direction was given to the jury to 
record a verdict of not guilty in favour of each of the defendants. 
This ruling was reversed on appeal to the Supreme Court. It held that as 
the arrest and detention by the Gardaf had been genuinely directed towards the 
investigation of the scheduled offence of malicious damage, the fact that they 
had come to be more attentive to the more serious though not scheduled offence 
of murder - which was closely linked with the scheduled offence of malicious 
damage - did not render illegal the arrest and detention process. In effect, the 
Supreme Court sanctioned the use of the minor holding charge (malicious 
damage to property) to permit questioning under section 30 in respect of the 
more serious, though non-scheduled, murder charge, provided there was a link 
between the two, and the Gardaf, in good faith, suspected the accused of having 
committed the minor charge. In People (DPP) v Howley, a non-subversive case 
involving a scheduled offence of cattle maiming and a non-scheduled offence of 
murder, the Supreme Court further enhanced Garda powers by holding that the 
link between the scheduled, minor offence and non-scheduled serious offence 
was not necessary, and that the predominant motive for the arrest did not need 
" Offences currently scheduled include those under the Explosive Substances Act, 1883 and the 
Firearms Acts, 1925-1971. 
16 A further 24 hour period of detention without charge is now provided for under the Offences 
Against the State (Amendment) Act, 1998. 
17 Report of the Committee to Review the Offences Against the State Acts, 1939·1998, dissenting 
views of Professor Dermot Walsh. 
18 [1986)IR 495. See also People (DPP) v Walsh [1988)ILRM 137; see also D. Walsh "The Impact 
of Anti-Subversive Laws on Police Powers and Practice in Ireland: the Silent Erosion of Individual 
Freedom" Tulane Law Review 62(4) (1989): pp. 1099-1102. 
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to be the minor, scheduled offence. All that was demanded was that the arrest be 
made in good faith, and brought about in circumstances where an actual Garda 
suspicion existed for the scheduled, albeit minor offence. 19 
Such decisions smack of Nelsonian blindness in that they sanction the 
detention of suspects under section 30 without the need for a connection to be 
made to the causal framework in which the scheduled offences were committed. 
At a more particular and legalistic level, there are two specific problems with 
the employment of section 30 for scheduled offences that do not involve 
paramilitary activity. First, the scheduling power granted to Government under 
section 36 is probably unconstitutional given that it provides the government 
with a power to legislate, thereby usurping the role of the Irish legislature (the 
Oireachtas) as provided for under Article 15.2.1 of the Constitution. Aside from 
this "constitutional infirmity"2o as it relates to the separation of powers, 
employing section 30 to arrest persons for offences not connected with 
paramilitary activity has facilitated the creation of an entirely capricious and 
discordant system of detention without charge, quite out of keeping with spirit 
of the constitutional guarantee of personal liberty as provided for under Article 
40.4.1 of the Irish Constitution. 
For example, under the law as it currently exists in Ireland, a person 
suspected of raping someone can only be detained without charge for a 
maximum period of 12 hours/I as provided for under section 4 of the Criminal 
Justice Act, 1984. If the same person was suspected of raping his neighbour, 
and at the time the offence was committed of having possession of an unloaded 
gun (which was unconnected with the offence of rape), he could be detained for 
a maximum period of 72 hours under the Offences Against the State Act, 1939, 
as amended, given that the possession of a firearm is a scheduled offence. If, as 
the Irish Council for Civil Liberties has pointed out, section 30 had been 
confined to paramilitary related offences, "there would at least be a logical 
explanation for the discrepancy in detention periods."22 
From an historical standpoint, permitting offences with no subversive 
connotations to fall within the rubric of extraordinary legislation because, 
stricto sensu, they are scheduled appears to be at enmity with the reasoning 
behind the enactment of the Offences Against the State Act 1939 - which was 
to safeguard the interests of the State against subversive elements. More 
practically, permitting terrorist legislation to be applied in such an insouciant 
manner represents a significant seepage from the extraordinary to the ordinary 
criminal justice realm. The creation of such a powerful investigative tool for the 
Gardai in ordinary criminal procedure - detention without charge for a 
maximum period of 72 hours - also constitutes a significant encroachment upon 
the civil liberty rights of suspects. As Professor Dermot Walsh noted in his 
dissenting views appended to the Report of the Committee to Review the 
Offences Against the State Acts, 1939-1998: 
19 [1989] ILRM 629. 
20 Report of the Committee to Review the Offences Against the State Acts, para. 7 .26 
11 The Criminal Justice Bill 2004 seeks to increase this maximum period to 24 hours. 
II Irish Council of Civil Liberties Submission to the Committee to Review the Offences Against the 
State Acts. /939-/998. and related matters available at: http://www.iccl.ie/criminaljlemergency/ 
99 _submission.oasa.html 
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In a society based on respect for human rights and civil liberties, a 
reasonable balance must maintained between the individual's 
fundamental right to liberty and the police need to use arrest and 
detention for the effective investigation and detection of crime. Since 
section 30 constitutes a gross departure from the norms governing police 
powers of arrest and detention, it follows that its retention needs to be 
justified by very convincing arguments ... [S]ection 30 constitutes an 
excessive and unwarranted intrusion on the individual's fundamental 
right to liberty in a "normal" society based on respect for human rights 
. . . A more reasonable balance needs to be struck between the 
requirements of effective criminal investigation and the individual's 
fundamental right to liberty.23 
(iii) The Retention of the Non-Jury Special Criminal Court for non-
paramilitary activities 
Further support for this normalisation process can also be gleaned from the 
retention of the non-jury Special Criminal Court (re-established in 1972) and its 
use for non-scheduled, non-terrorist offences. The introduction of the Court in 
1972, at the height of "the Troubles in Northern Ireland"/4 was justified on the 
basis that juries were likely to be intimidated by paramilitaries. It continues to 
be employed to day despite little in the way of a risk assessment as to whether 
or not there was a possibility of continued paramilitary intimidation.25 Moreover, 
the Special Criminal Court is increasingly being employed to try cases that have 
no paramilitary connections. Offences without subversive connections which 
have been tried in the Special Criminal Court include the supply of cannabis, 
arson at a public house, theft of computer parts, kidnapping, the murder of 
Veronica Guerin, receiving a stolen caravan and its contents, the unlawful 
taking of a motor car, and the theft of cigarettes and £150 from a shop.26 Such 
cases appear to verify Mary Robinson's concern, made in 1974, that the 
continuation of the Special Criminal Court would abolish the "jury trial by the 
back door."27 
Perhaps even more alarmingly, the decision to have such offences tried 
before the non-jury Special Criminal Court are not subject to any checks or 
safeguards. Under sections 46 and 47 of the Offences Against the State Act 
1939, the DPP has the power to have any case heard in the Special Criminal 
23 Report of the Committee to Review the Offences Against the State Acts, 1939-1998 dissenting 
views of Professor Dermot Walsh. 
" This was how the Irish government justified its introduction to the European Commission of 
Human Rights in Eccles, McPhillips and McShane v Ireland (Application No. 12839/87, Decision 
of 9 December 1988). 
" The Irish Council for Civil Liberties suggests that the "level of paramilitary violence has declined 
more than tenfold since the mid 1970s and the threat of paramilitary violence now comes largely 
from very small splinter groups with virtually no popular support." Irish Council of Civil Liberties 
Submission to the Committee to Review the Offences Against the State Acts, 1939-1998, and 
related matters available at: http://www.iccl.ie/criminalj/emergency/99_submission.oasa.html 
26 available at: http://www.iccl.ie/criminalj/emergency/99_submission.oasa.html 
21 M. Robinson, The Special Criminal Court (Dublin University Press, 1974). 
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Court where s/he is of the opinion that the ordinary courts are inadequate to 
secure the effective administration of justice. Significantly, the decision of the 
OPP to have a case tried in the Special Criminal Court is not susceptible to 
judicial review in the absence of evidence of mala fides or of being influenced 
by an improper motive or an improper policy. In Kavanagh v. Ireland, for 
example, the applicant was arrested on several charges in connection with the 
alleged false imprisonment of a senior manager of a banking company, 
demanding monies with menaces, and possession of a firearm. There was no 
evidence to suggest that the offences were committed on behalf of or to further 
subversive organisations. The OPP had certified that the ordinary courts, in his 
opinion, were inadequate to secure the effective administration of justice and 
the preservation of public peace and order in relation to the trial of the applicant 
on those charges, and directed that the applicant be brought before the Special 
Criminal Court and there charged with those offences. Kavanagh challenged the 
decision of the OPP to grant the appropriate certificate in respect of the non-
scheduled offences. In particular, he argued that this arrangement legitimated a 
prosecutorial practice of referring non-scheduled, non-subversive cases before 
the Special Criminal Court; denied him the right to equal protection of the law 
by creating a two tiered system of justice in that particular individuals found 
themselves before an extraordinary court whilst others, accused of similar 
offences, could be placed before ordinary courts; and, subverted the 
constitutional right to trial by jury. In the Supreme Court, it was held that as the 
determination of whether or not the ordinary courts were adequate to secure the 
effective administration of justice was political in orientation, such a decision 
should be regulated within the political rather than judicial arena. 28 
Kavanagh then applied to the Human Rights Committee of the United 
Nations, claiming that the procedures adopted in his case violated his 
entitlement to equality before the law as guaranteed by Article 26 of the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (lCCPR). The Human 
Rights Committee upheld his c1aim.29 Kavanagh then returned to the Irish courts 
and sought to have this decision recognised. In the High Court, however, it was 
held that he was not entitled to rely on rights under the ICCPR as they did not 
form part of domestic law.3D The unfettered and arbitrary nature of this 
2JJKavanagh v. Government of Ireland [1996] I.R. 321. In 1997, in the Special Criminal Court, 
Kavanagh was convicted of robbery, possession of a firearm with intent to commit an indictable 
offence of false imprisonment and demanding money with menaces; he received concurrent 
sentences of 12,12 and 5 years respectively to date from 20 July 1994. 
29 "No reasons are required to be given for the decision that the Special Criminal Court would be 
'proper' or that the ordinary courts are 'inadequate' and no reasons for the decision in the particular 
case have been provided to the Committee Moreover, judicial review of the DPP's decisions is 
effectively restricted to the most exceptional and virtually undemonstrable circumstances. The 
Committee considers that the State Party has failed to demonstrate that the decision to try the author 
before the Special Criminal Court was based on reasonable and objective grounds. Accordingly, the 
Committee concludes that the author's right under Article 26 to equality before the law and to equal 
protection of the law has been violated." Human Rights Committee of the United Nations, April 4, 
2001, (CCPR/CI7D/SI9/199S). 
"'Kavanagh v. Special Criminal Court (Unreported, High Court, 29 June, 2001). This decision was 
upheld in the Supreme Court where it was noted: "The provision of an international agreement 
which has not been adopted into Irish law cannot prevail over the legal effect of a conviction by a 
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arrangement - which requires no reasons or justifications to be given by the 
DPP for circumventing the ordinary court process and the right to trial by jury -
seems inherently unjust, particularly so in relation to offences that do not 
involve subversive activities. It also stands far apart, in dissonant isolation, from 
one's constitutional right to a jury trial, as provided for under Article 38.5, and 
is indicative of the increasingly more result-orientated logic being adopted in 
the Irish penal complex. 
Even despite its breach of the ICCPR, and the fact that it was established 
under an anti-terrorist framework that is no longer applicable,31 the arrangement 
continues to be justified on the basis of its usefulness to the State in combating 
organised crime - a form of crime that has, without much debate, assumed the 
"folk devil" security-threatening status previously only associated in Ireland 
with political violence.32 Indeed the Offences Against the State Review 
Committee recently argued for the retention of the Special Criminal Court on 
the grounds that the threat posed by organised crime alone is sufficient to justify 
its maintenance. Much of the reasoning behind this justification was premised 
on the notion that "there have been instances in recent times where it appears 
that attempts have been made to tamper with juries in high-profile criminal 
trials in the ordinary courts." To be content to justify the continuance of a non-
jury, extraordinary court on the fragile, somewhat whimsical, evidence of 
"instances" - without feeling the need to present any qualitative or quantitative 
verification, or to engage in any debate as to whether such evidence tipped the 
balance in favour of enhancing security or preventing the loss of liberties -
raises serious questions about the State's commitment to the values enshrined 
by the Irish people in its Constitution. As Fennell suggests: 
[T]he existence of an "emergency" or extraordinary regime outside 
constitutional parameters in the context of the Special Criminal Court 
has been facilitated by the folk devil of terrorism. This emergency 
measure has facilitated the existence of differential, exceptional or "non-
constitutional" treatment for certain offenders. Moreover . . . the 
phenomenon would appear to be ongoing as the demonisation of drugs 
and organised crime may ensure a future currency for this exceptional 
provision, and its persistence even in light of elimination or resolution of 
its originating raison d'etre. This dissonance at the heart of the Irish 
criminal justice system in terms of departure from overt constitutional 
values is not insignificant in assessing its adherence to principle.33 
duly constituted Irish court." Kavanagh v. The Governor of Mountjoy Prison and the A.G 
(Unreported, Supreme Court, I March, 2002). The European Convention on Human Rights Act was 
enacted in 2003. The incorporation of the Convention, however, is minimalist in orientation. Indeed, 
on a strict interpretation, it does not incorporate the Convention; it merely gives it (subject to 
constitutional provisions) "greater effect" in domestic law. See U. Kilkelly, ECHR and Irish Law 
(Jordans, 2004). 
31 See, for example, the Report of the UN Human Rights Committee in 1993 which suggested that "it 
did not consider that the continued existence of that court is justified in the present circumstances." 
Report of the Human Rights Committee, Official Records of the General Assembly, 48'" Session, 
Supplement No. 40, 1993,(N48/40), Part I, pp 125-128 
32 See, for example, the Committee to Review the Offences Against the State Acts. 1939·1998. para. 937. 
3J C. Fennell, The Law of Evidence in Ireland, 28. 
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(iv) Seizing Criminal Assets without requiring a Criminal Conviction 
The Proceeds of Crime Bill was mooted in Ireland in the mid 1990s to combat 
the dangers posed to society by drug-related crime. The current Act was initially 
proposed as a private member's Bill, one week after the assassination of 
journalist Veronica Guerin.3' Five weeks later, the normally sluggish and 
consultative legislative process was complete and the Proceeds of Crime Act 
was law. Indeed, and in something of a reversal of the established position in 
Ireland of political imitation and policy transfer from other jurisdictions, the 
"structure and modus operandi of the Criminal Assets Bureau [the bureau 
empowered to seize assets under the Proceeds of Crime Act, 1996] have been 
identified as models for other countries which are in the process of targeting the 
proceeds of crime."35 
The Act's cardinal feature permits the Criminal Assets Bureau to secure 
interim and interlocutory orders against a person's property, provided that it can 
demonstrate that the specified property - which has a value in excess of 
_13,000 - constitutes, directly or indirectly, the proceeds of crime. If the 
interlocutory order survives in force for a period of seven years,36 an application 
for disposal can then be made. This extinguishes all rights in the property that 
the respondent party may have had. 
The speed with which the legislation was introduced is a cause of 
concern, not least because of the manner in which it seeks to circumvent 
criminal procedural safeguards guaranteed under Article 38 of the Constitution. 
In particular, the legislation authorises the confiscation of property in the 
absence of a criminal conviction; permits the introduction of hearsay evidence;37 
lowers the threshold of proof to the balance of probabilities; and, requires a 
party against whom an order is made to produce evidence in relation to his or 
her property and income to rebut the suggestion that the property constitutes the 
proceeds of crime.3S This practice of pursuing the criminal money trail through 
the civil jurisdiction raises all sorts of civil liberty concerns about hearsay 
evidence, the burden of proof, and the presumption of innocence. Moreover, 
and given the revenue producing capacity of the Criminal Assets Bureau, the 
temptation, as Lea notes, "to displace concerns of justice with those of revenue 
flows cannot be ruled OUt."39 
The primary impetus for this model was derived, once again, from the 
terrorist domain where the Offences Against the State (Amendment) Act 1985 -
a piece of legislation also introduced extremely quickly - empowered the 
" See also J. Meade, "Organised Crime, Moral Panic and Law Reform: the Irish Adoption of Civil 
Forfeiture," Irish Criminal Law Journal, 10(1) (2000): pp. 11-16. 
35 See Criminal Assets Bureau, Annual Report 1999, (Stationery Office, 2000), 5. 
,. The Proceeds of Crime (Amendment) Bill, 2003 proposes to reduce this period to three years. 
37 It has been held, however, that where there is no other corroborative evidence, courts should be 
reluctant to grant an interlocutory order on the basis solely of hearsay evidence. 
38 The DPP would not, it appears, be entitled to use such evidence, should it be forthcoming, in a 
future criminal prosecution. See M v.D (Unreported, High Court, 10 December, 1996); see also J.P. 
McCutcheon, and D. Walsh, "Seizure of Criminal Assets: An Overview" Irish Criminal Law 
Journal, 9(2) (1999): pp. 127-132. 
39 J. Lea, (2001) 'Crime Control and Civil Liberties', available at http://www.bunker8.pwp.blue 
yonder.co.ukl. 
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Minister for Justice to certify that money held in banks which was the property 
of an unlawful organisation should be forfeited and vested in the Minister.'o This 
certification by the Minister was not dependent on the initiation of criminal 
proceedings. The Act contained further provisions entitling a person who 
claimed to be the owner of the money to apply to the High Court for an order 
directing the return of the money if he or she could demonstrate that it was not 
the proceeds from the operations of an unlawful organisation. In introducing the 
Bill to the Dail in 1985, the then Minister for Justice stated as follows: 
The necessity for this Bill arises from a specific situation that has arisen 
and which has such serious implications for the maintenance of public 
order in this country that the Government have no option but to move 
with speed and decisiveness to deal with it. Information has been 
conveyed to me by the Garda authorities that a large sum of money 
which is the proceeds of criminal activity by the IRA - specifically 
extortion under threat of kidnap and murder - has found its way into a 
bank in this country and is being held to the use of and for the purposes 
of the IRA ... This necessitated urgent action by the Government to 
prevent the money becoming available to the IRA to fund their campaign 
of murder and destruction." 
The 1985 Act had a life span of three months and was only designed to combat 
the threat posed by the one terrorist incident cited by the Minister in introducing 
the Bill. The powers conferred under the legislation were only ever invoked in 
respect of that one specific cases. Indeed, the Minister in introducing the Bill 
recognised the draconian nature of the powers conferred but justified it having 
regard to the "evils of the IRA": 
Before I conclude I want to say that the Government have not lightly 
brought forward this Bill and would not have done so were it not 
convinced that the Bill is essential and that there is no other way of 
dealing with the problem that now faces us. I do not deny that it is a 
strong measure and that the power it confers on the Minister is one that 
ought never to be used lightly. I can and do now give a firm assurance 
that I will not use it lightly but it may be more to the point if I say that I 
do not think that it can ever be used lightly ... 42 
Arising out of this one incident, the provisions of the 1985 Act were held up to 
judicial scrutiny in the case of Clancy v Ireland:3 where Barrington J, in a brief 
judgment, held that the abridgment of property rights provided for under the Act 
was a permissible delimitation of property rights having regard to the common 
'" See F. Cassidy and The Law Society of Ireland Money Laundering and the Criminal Assets 
Bureau (Law Society, 2003), 8. Other impetuses for the Proceeds of Crime Act, 1996 would include 
legislative initiatives in the United States in the early 1970s and a number of international 
conventions on drug trafficking, money laundering, confiscation of the proceeds of crime in the late 
1980s and early 1990s. 
41 Sean ad Eireann, Vol 107, 19 February, 1985, col. 316 
"Seanad Eireann, Vol 107,19 February, 1985, col. 322. 
41 [1988)IR 326. 
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good, and was not in breach of fair procedures. This 1985 terrorist legislation, 
and the decision to uphold it in Clancy, provided a constitutional template, 
albeit in the extra-ordinary realm, for the confiscation of assets in the absence 
of a criminal conviction. With only a slight skip and a jump, and the odd wink 
or two, the same template could be exploited in the ordinary realm having 
regard to proceeds of crime legislation. This is precisely what happened. For 
example, when introducing the Proceeds of Crime Bill to the Dliil, its initiator, 
Mr John O'Donoghue, could suggest as follows: 44 
The suggestion that this Bill is in some unspecified way unconstitutional 
is equally unsustainable. A clear and direct precedent exists for 
legislation of this type. The Offences Against the State (Amendment) 
Act, 1985, permits the freezing of assets of illegal organizations. The 
constitutionality of that Act was tested in the High Court in the case of 
Clancy v Ireland . .. Similarly a direct precedent exists for the acceptance 
of the court of opinion evidence from a Garda Superintendent.45 The 
Offences Against the State (Amendment) Act, 1972, provides in section 
3(2) that the belief of a member of the Garda Siochana, not below the 
rank of chief superintendent is sufficient evidence on which to grant a 
conviction for membership of an unlawful organization.46 
Such reasoning provides further evidence of the obfuscation of the clear lines 
that should exist between extraordinary and ordinary provisions. It is a sign of 
the dissonance that currently exists in relation to constitutional values, and the 
extent to which the system no longer irradiates with due process ideals. In 
seeking to constitutionally legitimate an ordinary Bill by reference to 
extraordinary provisions, John O'Donoghue swept over a breadth of history that 
acknowledges that statutes such as the Offences Against the State (Amendment) 
Act, 1985, are premised on extraordinary powers that are designed to combat 
the threat posed by subversives intent on overthrowing the State. The 
constitutionality of such extraordinary provisions is supposedly closely tethered 
to the notion that they are a proportionate, albeit draconian, response to the 
emergency threat posed. In particular, the Clancy decision must be seen against 
the legislative background of the Offences Against the State Act, 1939 which 
was enacted to combat the threat posed by unlawful organisations, such as the 
IRA, which engage in "activity of a treasonable nature", advocate "the 
procuring by force" of "an alteration of the Constitution", or raise or maintain 
"a military or armed force in contravention of the Constitution."41 Indeed, the 
possibility of an overspill from the extra-ordinary to the ordinary realm, as 
.. Dail Eireann, Vol 467, 2'd July, 1996, col. 2409. 
" This relates to the hearsay provision in the Proceeds of Crime legislation. 
46 The provision in question, section 3(2) of the Offences Against the State (Amendment) Act, 1972 
was also designed to combat the threat of terrorism. A discussion of the overspill of this provision 
into the ordinary realm take place further on in the text. 
47 See Section 18 of the Offences Against the State Act, 1939. In cases where the Proceeds of Crime 
Act, 1996, has been subject to constitutional challenge, the State, inter alia, has also relied on the 
constitutional support provided by the decision in Clancy. See Michael Murphy v GM, PB, PC, GH; 
John Gilligan v CAB, Revenue Commissioners, The Garda Commissioner, Ireland and the Attorney 
General [200 IJ 4 IR 113. See also Gilligan v Criminal Assets Bureau [1998JI.R. 326. 
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regards the Offences Against the State Amendment Act, 1985, was remarked 
upon by Senator Brendan Ryan. Commenting on the Offences Against the State 
(Amendment) Bill, 1985, as it passed through the Seanad (the Irish 
parliamentary equivalent of the House of Lords), he suggested: "Every power 
that I am aware of that has been given under emergency legislation ... has been 
abused and extended beyond its initial intent and purpose. While it is not for me 
to weep over those who have millions of pounds on deposit in banks if the 
Minister for Justice or the Government choose to make life difficult for them, 
nevertheless I wonder about the possibilities that will be read into such a 
provision in years to come because the evidence in the past is that what may 
well be necessary to deal with a specific task can become very convenient to 
deal with a vast range of tasks."48 
The enactment of the Proceeds of Crime Act, 1996 has only proved his 
point too well. It must be seen as part of the expanding repertoire of 
exclusionary, tactics designed by the State to contend with criminal deviance. 
The thrust of the current trend has very much been towards the crime control 
model of justice as prescribed by Herbert Packer, namely efficiency and outputs, 
an instrumental logic that emphasises the repression of criminal conduct as a 
primary concern, an emphasis on administrative fact finding processes, and a 
dislike of "equality of arms" values such as the presumption of innocence and 
the privilege against self-incrimination:9 In particular, where biographical 
knowledge was employed under the modern penal welfarist framework to 
socialise the deviant, produce new kinds of knowledge about the origins of 
crime that would facilitate intervention and displace a "common law polity 
which presupposed a homogeneous dangerous class" ,50 now it is increasingly 
employed, as in the extra-ordinary realm, not to normalise but to neutralize the 
threat posed. Knowledge in this extra-ordinary realm is almost entirely 
premised on the maintenance of fragile borders of exclusion through "risk 
thinking,"51 disciplinary law, a politics of safety and the management of the 
dangerous. As Ericson and Carriere have suggested: "the values of the unsafe 
society displace those of the unequal society."52 
(v) The acceptance of supergrass testimony in the ordinary criminal 
justice system 
On a slightly more remote footing - though evidence of the normalisation 
process and the result-orientated logic of the system more generally - is the 
introduction of a witness protection programme, set up following the murder of 
Veronica Guerin, to assist the Garda! in the fight against organised crime. The 
48 Seanad Eireann, Vol 107, 19 February, 1985, cols, 328-329. 
49 See H.L Packer, The Limits of the Criminal Sanction (Stanford University Press, 1968) 
'" R. Pound, "The Administration of Justice in the Modern City" Harvard Law Review 26 (1912-
1913): 309; see also R. Pound, "Discretion, Dispensation and Mitigation: The Problems of the 
Individual Special Case" New York University Law Review 35 (1960): 925-937. The extent to which 
the socialization law has ever occurred in Ireland is, however, debatable. 
" See N. Rose, "Government and Control" British Journal of Criminology 40 (2000): pp. 321-339. 
" R. Ericson, and K. Carriere "The Fragmentation of Criminology" in The Futures of Criminology 
ed. D. Nelken (Sage, 1994), pp. 102-103. 
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type of witnesses protected by the programme are not simply run-of-the-mill 
self-confessed accomplices, but fall into a definitional category more in keeping 
with supergrass testimony,53 a term made infamous following a series of 
paramilitary trials in the Diplock Courts in Northern Ireland in the I 980s.54 The 
damning information which such witnesses have provided has been utilised by 
the State to apprehend and prosecute a series of high profile individuals 
operating in the world of organised crime. In return for such information, the 
witnesses, who themselves had also repeatedly partaken in criminal activities, 
were given the opportunity of an improved lifestyle. 
For example, one witness, Charles Bowden, in return for information on 
members of the so-called Gilligan gang and their alleged involvement in the 
murder of Veronica Guerin and drug trafficking, was given a series of 
privileges. They included: an undertaking from the DPP that he would not be 
prosecuted for his part in the murder of Veronica Guerin; a very modest prison 
sentence having pleaded guilty to serious drugs and firearms charges; special 
concessions while serving the sentence; his wife and children all received the 
benefit of the witness protection programme and were completely dependent on 
the State for financial support while Bowden served his sentence; and, it was 
promised that he and his family would be set up with new identities in a foreign 
country on his release from prison. All of these tactics - immunity from 
prosecution, lenient sentences, and resettlement under new identities - were 
also very evident in the supergrass trials that took place in Northern Ireland. 
Aside from the possibility of jeopardising the entire criminal procedure 
process by admitting evidence which is highly susceptible to fabrication and 
exaggeration, and which is often incapable of being properly verified, the 
practice of utilising such witnesses has also increased the likelihood of Garda 
corruption, particularly in relation to information gathering. Indeed, in the 
Special Criminal Court in The People (D?P) v. John Gilligan/5 it was pointed 
out that these witnesses, who were later referred to in court as "perjurers and 
self-serving liars", were often interviewed by the Garda! without any record 
being kept as to the contents of the interviews. Moreover, it was also alleged 
that payments were made to the same witnesses by the Garda!, which purported 
to belong to the witnesses, but which, to all intents and purposes, appears to 
B Perhaps given the negative connotations associated with the word, and given what was held in the 
particular Court, the Special Criminal Court in The People v. Paul Ward (Unreported, Special 
Criminal Court, 27 November, 1998) held that the testimony of such witnesses on the programme in 
Ireland did not constitute 'supergrass' testimony. On appeal to the Court of Criminal Appeal 
(Unreported, Court of Criminal Appeal, 22 March 2002), however, Murphy 1. left the question 
open: "Whether or not Charles Bowden fell within the category comprised in the slang expression 
'supergrass', clearly his general lack of credibility and his position as a criminal negotiating with 
the authorities to secure advantage for himself at the expense of his former friends and criminal 
associates did require that his evidence should be considered with the utmost care." In John Gilligan 
v DPP (Unreported, Court of Criminal Appeal, 8 August, 2003) the Court of Criminal Appeal attempted 
to distinguish witnesses such as Bowden and Warren from supergrass witnesses on the basis that the 
testimony of the latter implicated many accuseds and it was usually the sole evidence against them. 
" S. Greer, "Supergrasses in the Legal System in Britain and Northern Ireland," Law Quarterly 
Review 102 (1986): pp. 198-249; S. Greer, Supergrasses: A Study in Anti-Terrorist Law Enforcement 
in Northern Ireland (Clarendon Press, 1995). 
" People (DPP) v. John Gilligan (Unreported, Special Criminal Court, March 15,2001). 
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have been the proceeds of crime. On appeal, McCracken 1. noted the following 
about the witness protection programme: 
There are certainly some very disturbing factors in the way in which the 
authorities sought to obtain the evidence ... This was the first time that a 
witness protection programme had been implemented in this State, and 
one of the most worrying features is that there never seems to have 
actually been a programme. There ought to have been clear guidelines as 
to what could or could not be offered to the witnesses. This was not 
done, and instead there was an ongoing series of demands by the 
witnesses, most of which, it must be said, were rejected, but the position 
was kept fluid almost right up to the time when they gave evidence ... 
[T]he authorities appeared at all times to be open to negotiation, but is 
something which certainly ought not to have been allowed to happen.56 
The introduction of a witness protection programme for the first time in the 
history of the state constitutes, to some extent, a recognition of the limitations 
of ordinary Garda methods of controlling and regulating organised crime. It 
represents a highly pragmatic and result-orientated information gathering technique 
for the Garda! in their attempts to pierce the veil of organised crime. Significantly, 
however, it is also indicative of a declining support for procedural safeguards. 
The dangers of convicting on uncorroborated testimony, the potential for 
fabrication and exaggeration, the possibility of witness evidence being shaped 
to suit particular ends especially in the light of the inducements that may exist, 
the lack of Garda accountability regarding its handling of such witnesses, the 
tendency of such evidence to lower the threshold of proof from "guilty beyond 
reasonable doubt" to "probably guilty," and the likelihood that most of these 
cases will be heard in the non-jury Special Criminal Court, all signpost and 
assist in tipping the State-accused relation balance in favour of the former. 57 
Current ambivalence about such testimony and the "fluidity" in the 
operation of the programme is even more surprising when one considers that 
only 20 years ago Irish politicians and the general public condemned with gusto 
the adoption of similar extraordinary practices in Northern Ireland. For 
example, on 17 May 1984 Fianna Fail TD, Ben Briscoe, stated in the Dail: "The 
,. John Gillgan v DPP (Unreported, Court of Criminal Appeal, 8 August, 2003) per McCracken J. at 
p. 12. In the same court it was noted: "A further worry arises from the evidence of ... an official in 
the Department of Justice who wrote a memorandum in relation to granting overnight temporary 
releases to the witnesses which included the following: "The question of an overnight TR was also 
discussed. And this was not ruled out by the Gardai. The granting of an overnight would only be 
considered for a very special occasion and would be dependent on his peiformance in court." He 
gave that memo to an Assistant Secretary in the Department to be shown to the Minister and the 
memo came back with the words 'and would be dependent on his peiformance in court' crossed out." 
" Strict judicial interpretations of such accomplice testimony can act as a counterpoint to its 
potential to compromise the criminal process system. See, for example, People (DPP) v Paul Ward 
(Unreported, Court of Criminal Appeal, 22 March, 2002). For examples of cases where such 
testimony has been accepted, see People (DPP) v. Brian Meehan (Unreported, Special Criminal 
Court, 29 July 1999); The People (DPP) v. John Gilligan (Unreported, Special Criminal Court, 15 
March, 2001; The People (DPP) v. Paul Ward (Unreported, Special Criminal Court, 27 November, 
1998). 
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whole concept of the supergrass seems to go against human rights ... It is 
important that we are seen to be on the side of justice." In the same sitting, 
another Fianna Fail TD, Gerry Collins, referred to the supergrass system as "not 
only a travesty but a corruption of justice."58 Similarly, the Minister for Foreign 
Affairs in 1986, Mr Peter Barry, in response to a question in the Dail about the 
supergrass system in Northern Ireland, could suggest that he was committed, 
through inter-governmental conferences, to seeking the "introduction of 
measures to increase public confidence in the administration of justice in 
Northern lreland."59 In the space of two decades, however, arguments about the 
right to a fair trial, the protection of the innocent, transparent management, and 
basic human rights have been displaced by the need for a more efficient "truth 
seeking" criminal justice system. Albeit referring more to the reorientation in 
State-offender relations as opposed to State-accused relations, this general point 
has been picked up by Garland. Asking why it is that offenders' perceived worth 
"tends towards zero", as reflected in the deprivation of their "citizenship status", 
he answers by suggesting the following: 
[W]e allow ourselves to forget what penal-welfarism took for granted: 
namely that offenders are citizens too and their liberty interests are our 
liberty interests. The growth of a social and cultural divide between 'us' 
and 'them', together with new levels of fear and insecurity, has made 
many complacent about the emergence of a more repressive state power. 
In the 1 960s, critics accused penal-welfare institutions of being 
authoritarian when they wielded their correctional powers in a sometimes 
arbitrary manner. Today's criminal justice state is characterised by a 
more unvarnished authoritarianism with none of the benign pretensions.60 
More specifically, Lea, in describing the emerging pattern, puts it well when he 
suggests: 
It fosters what might be called the security culture which is one in which 
the end justifies the means. The criminal justice system is viewed solely 
from the standpoint of efficiency and the concern for civil liberties 
becomes a sort of afterthought in which we are assured that 'safeguards 
will of course be respected' but the system is not designed around them 
as where respect for rule of law and due process are seen as vital 
mechanisms in securing public confidence in the system and hence the 
flow of information about crime. Such concerns are increasingly an 
irritant and (from the standpoint of practitioners) intrusions which can be 
safely ignored to make the organisation more rather than less efficient.6 ! 
" See Dail Debates, 17 May, 1984, Vol. 350, cols 1390 et seq; Dail Debates, 25 October, 1983, Vol. 
345, col 481. 
"Dail Debates, 6 February, 1986, vol. 363, col 1978; see also Dail Debates, 2 December, 1997, vol. 
483, col. 62. per G. Mitchell. 
'" D. Garland, The Culture of Control: Crime and Social Order in Contemporary Society (Oxford 
University Press, 2001), pp. 181-182. 
61 J. Lea (2001) 'Crime Control and Civil Liberties', available at http://www.bunker8.pwp. 
blueyonder.co.ukl. For other provisions that exist in respect of witness intimidation, see section 41 
of the Criminal Justice Act, 1999. 
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A Criminology of the 'Extraordinary' 
'Sovereign is he who decides upon the exception' (Carl Schmitt)62 
The resilience of the penal-welfare complex so ably described by Garland 
rested in part on a perceived affinity between "ordinary citizens" and offenders 
and a sense that they did not pose a fundamental threat to the state. Failure to 
inculcate appropriate societal norms in convicted criminals was seen as a 
correctional defect that reflected poorly on the state. The majority of convicted 
criminals were viewed as conditional citizens who could be re-integrated into 
the heart of civil society under expert tutelage. To effect such re-integration, a 
knowledge of where an offender had diverged from the path of normality was 
gained through deployment of human sciences. The extent to which this norm 
pre-dominated and permeated penal practice is still in dispute and Garland's 
work is the latest attempt to resolve this issue. 
Ireland, to some extent however, has followed a different penal trajectory 
than many other liberal democracies which has mitigated against the emergence 
of a penal-welfare complex. To begin with, Ireland has never witnessed a 
sustained commitment to the "project of solidarity" ideals such as rehabilitation 
and reintegration or a correctionalist criminology agenda. The tendency for 
policy makers has been to focus on pragmatism, expediency and intuition at the 
expense of strategic vision. Some significant consequences arise as a result of 
treading this alternative route. The first was that there was little interest shown 
in rehabilitation and thus the human sciences had little impact upon penal 
practice.63 Ireland's distinctive penal characteristic was not that policy-makers 
may not have lent much weight to rehabilitation or that it was overshadowed by 
other concerns. Models of rehabilitation derived from the human sciences never 
made an appearance in operational practice within the Irish criminal justice 
system for most of the twentieth century. This, to some extent, has shielded 
Ireland from the nihilism of "nothing works." A different momentum is being 
generated here as compared to countries like England and Wales and the US. 
Any drift to crime control in Ireland, accordingly, is occurring in a more oblique 
and staccato way. 
The second important consequence is that Ireland's civil war from 1919-
21 and the outbreak of troubles in Northern Ireland from 1969 meant that 
democracy in Ireland was thought to be extremely fragile and in need of 
emergency powers to sustain it against the "enemy within" who sought to 
subvert the state. This meant that Ireland placed a degree of reliance on extra-
ordinary legal powers to counter this threat which the normal legal apparatus 
seemed ill-equipped to do. In many respects, this has facilitated the fast-
tracking of a crime control model of justice as it relates to issues such as an 
emphasis on security, public protection and the devaluation of accuseds' rights. 
The somewhat unique position of Ireland as regards its extra-ordinary 
legal powers raises interesting questions about the pursuit of the rule of law in a 
liberal democracy. These questions are not unique to our times and have been 
" C. Schmitt (1988) Political Theology: Four Chapters on the Concept of Sovereignty (MIT Press), p.5. 
63 For a ful\er account, see Ki1commins, O'Donnel\, O'Sul\ivan, and Vaughan, Crime, Punishment 
and the Search for Order in Ireland. 
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raised before, most poignantly in the case of Weimar Germany. As democracy 
crumbled under the political extremism of left and right, the German jurist Carl 
Schmitt advocated the suspension of normal laws and the invocation of emergency 
powers by the president. Schmitt ended up being lauded by the Nazi's as their 
crown jurist and interrogated by the Allies after the war.64 His disastrous lack of 
political judgement should not blind us to the challenge he throws down to the 
belief that democracies are irrevocably bound by the rule of law. 
Schmitt indicted liberal democracies for their blind faith in the rule of 
law which left them helpless before exceptional events that threatened their very 
existence. Faced by such a threat, liberal democracies could only survive by 
appointing a dictator who would invoke emergency powers in which 
"everything is justified that appears to be necessary for a concretely gained 
success."65 This sovereign figure suspends law but his or her edicts still have the 
force of law, no longer hampered by checks and balances. From a contemporary 
perspective, current democracies, of which Ireland may be a trail-blazer, seem 
less susceptible to Schmitt's charge. And the reasons are not hard to discern. 
Schmitt believed that the defining question of politics was the distinction 
between friend and enemy, reminiscent of President Bush's observation that 
"you are either with us or against us in the fight against terror." In such a period, 
"all legitimate and normative illusions with which men like to deceive 
themselves regarding political realities in periods of untroubled security vanish"66 
and the sovereign has a free hand to protect the community. The Hobbesian 
spectre of unchecked animosity motivates people to vest the state with the 
ultimate power of decision-making: to decide whether there exists a state of 
emergency and to decide what must be done to eliminate it. For Schmitt, the 
political sphere - with the mutually hostile relationship of friend and foe 
intrinsic to it - transcends and supercedes the legal sphere with its presumption 
to universalism. Political life cannot be bound by legal norms as it is the former 
that makes the latter possible. It is for the sovereign to decide whether the 
community is being threatened. This can only be done by recourse to a decision, 
motivated by an actual historical event, rather than a timeless legal norm. Law is 
subservient to politics and may need to be suspended so that politics can survive. 
Undoubtedly, Schmitt's account suffers from a startling lack of concern 
for how this arbitrary power might be put to use. As we have seen with Ireland, 
it is highly unlikely that the law will be suspended completely in a state of 
emergency. Instead, a special zone will be set up in which normal laws do not 
apply. As a result of public and political pressure, this zone expands to 
incorporate more and more normal crime. There is not one supreme moment of 
sovereignty in which laws are suspended. The normalization of the exception is 
achieved through a steady accretion of views which go largely unchallenged . 
.. He announced to his Russian interrogators, "( drank the Nazi bacillus but was not infected." See 
the discussion of Schmitt in M. Lilla, The Reckless Mind: Intellectuals in Politics (New York 
Review of Books, 200 I ), p. 52. 
" J.P. McCormick, Carl Schmitt's Critique of Liberalism (Cambridge University Press, 1997), p. 
124. Schmitt originally saw the establishment of a dictatorship as a time-bound institution necessary 
to return a government to a state of normality but later magnified the decision-making powers of the 
sovereign as the only entity capable of saving politics from degradation. 
66 McCormick, Carl Schmitt's Critique of Liberalism, p. 252. 
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Without much thought or assessment, those involved in organized crime 
in Ireland have quickly been elevated to the status of a security threat equivalent 
to that of the paramilitaries. The intense outrage produced by such crimes, 
coupled with demands for the State to reassert its power through the criminal 
justice system, has resulted in a "national emergency" that demands that ever 
clearer lines be drawn between a fearful public and "monstrous" criminals. 
Increasingly, the state has been tempted to turn to its long history of 
extraordinary provisions to combat the threat posed by ordinary, "folk devil" 
criminals. It does so in the absence of any considered debate about the actual 
threats posed by such individuals, the suitability of extraordinary provisions in 
the circumstances, or the impact on due process values in general reminiscent of 
Schmitt's scorn for protracted discussion. What has been called the 
"decision ism" in Schmitt's philosophy of law is exemplified by former Justice 
Minister John O'Donoghue's desire not to be part of the "can't do anything, 
won't do anything brigade."67 
A glance at the parliamentary reports and judicial reports over the years 
demonstrates the metaphoric pathways being created between terrorism and 
ordinary crime . 
• "[D]rugs have replaced terrorism as the number one threat to the security of 
the State."6S 
• "Just as President Clinton proclaimed in his visit to Belfast that the children 
of this generation in Northern Ireland have a right to be born and raised in an 
environment free from terrorist violence, so too do the children of this 
generation throughout Ireland have the right to be born and raised in an 
environment free from criminal violence and abuse"69 
• "Whether we like it or not there is a state of emergency. It is no use saying 
otherwise. This has happened because ... [civil libertarians] ... who are 
always trotted out whenever there is a situation like that created by the 
dreadful murder of the journalist, Veronica Guerin, have been saying for a 
long time that criminals are entitled to their civil rights. These murderers 
and criminals do not recognise other people's civil rights. Why should 
we recognise theirs? We should open up the Curragh [a former military 
camp] and intern them. People who are caught selling drugs, purchasing 
drugs, or selling them to get their own free deals should be taken out of 
circulation."70 
OJ Dail Debates, 30 January, 2002, vol. 547, col 113, per Mr O'Donoghue. 
68 Dail Debates, 6" February, 1996, vol. 641, col 284, per Mr Haughey. 
II> Seanad Debates, 31 January, 1996, vol 146, col 88, per Mr 0' Kennedy. 
70 Dail Debates, 4th July, 1996, vol 488, col. 554-555, per Mr Briscoe. Internment is now provided 
for under Part II of the Offences Against the State (Amendment) Act, 1940. It comes into force, if 
and when the government publishes a proclamation declaring that internment is necessary to secure 
the preservation of public peace and order. The majority of the Committee established to review the 
Offences Against the State Acts, 1939-1998, declared that "internment as a measure could under 
appropriate conditions constitute a legitimate, exceptional response to exceptional circumstances." 
Report of the Committee to Review the Offences Against the State Acts, 1939 to 1998, para. 5.55. 
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• " ... I mentioned the threat the IRA posed, and continues to pose, to this 
State. I have also begun to wonder whether there is the same realisation of the 
threat posed to our society by the criminal underworld .... I was informed of 
a community meeting held in Dublin recently at which the drugs problem was 
discussed, when there was a discreet Special Branch presence outside the 
building endeavouring to ascertain whether there was any IRA presence .... I 
wonder whether all criminals nationwide are watched as closely. We must 
encourage rather than discourage such surveillance."71 
• The collapse of a murder trial in November, 2003 lead to claims about a 
"crime crisis"; suggestions that the "fabric of society ... [was] at risk"; calls 
for more "anti-terrorist type laws;" and a recognition by the Taoiseach that the 
Gardai "cannot take on a crowd of gangsters with their peann luaidhes 
(pencils)."72 
• In Gilligan v Criminal Assets Bureau the presiding judge concluded that there 
existed "an entirely new type of professional criminal who . . . renders 
himself virtually immune to the ordinary procedures of criminal investigation 
and prosecution" and that this necessitated the use of the "lower probative 
requirements of the civil law . . . not to achieve penal sanctions but to 
effectively deprive such persons of such illicit financial fruits of their 
labours." The judge argued that the kind of crime to be targeted, drug-
trafficking, was "probably perceived by ordinary members of the community 
as more threatening and more likely to effect [sic] the everyday lives of 
themselves and their children [than terrorism]."73 
This changed political context has ramifications for how the operations in the 
penal sphere are being conducted. One of the implications of the penal-welfare 
context was that the psychiatrist had a "judiciary role within the very unfolding 
of justice"74 advising what kind of sentence is necessary. These kinds of pronounce-
71 Dail Debates, 31uly, 1996, vol 468, col 373. 
72 See The Irish Times, 6 November, 2003, pp. 6-7. On the value put on due process more generally, 
see the comments of Paul Connaughton in the Dail: "Democracy is built on the rights assigned to 
individuals and communities over a period and the nonnal evolution of rights in a progressive 
society means introducing more liberal laws to enable people to think and act for themselves. 
However a dangerous culture has grown up here in the past few years whereby more and more 
rights are assigned to wrongdoers, lawbreakers, muggers and all sorts of evildoers. The perpetrators 
of crime now have more rights than the victims. The poacher has outfoxed the gamekeeper ... We 
had better accept that the fight is on. This is not something that has arisen in the past two months. lt 
has been a creeping paralysis over the past ten or 15 years ... Any person who peddles drugs should 
be sentenced to hard labour. I would not be sorry if the death penalty were reintroduced for 
convicted drug barons. We have reached the stage where we must introduce draconian measures. 
The godfathers of crime have access to infonnation and are legally well briefed. They are playing 
for extremely high stakes ... I have little time for the champions of civil liberties and do gooders as 
far as this issue is concerned. It is incumbent on us to put the boot in." Dail Debates, 14 March, 
1996, vol 463, cols. 318-322. 
73 See Gilligan v The Criminal Assets Bureau [1998] 3 IR 185; S. Murphy, "Tracing the Proceeds of 
Crime" Irish CriminaL Law JournaL 9(2) (1999): p. 165. 
" M. Foucault, "White Magic and Black Gown" in FoucauLt Live (interviews, 1961-1984) ed, 
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ments depend on a relative imbalance of power between state and offender so 
that police investigations proceed relatively smoothly. As John Lea points out in 
his paper in this volume, the rise of organized crime throws this process into 
disarray. Findings of guilt are harder to secure and the principle of re-integration 
is called into question. This alters the customary modality of doing justice. 
In combating such crime, the state is no longer relying on the 
powerlknowledge nexus that Foucault believed was at the heart of modem 
punishment. Or, at least, it is a very different kind of knowledge serving a 
distinct purpose of power. In cases influenced by "extra-ordinary" legislation, 
the knowledge that is being demanded is not employed as part of any 
aetiological process, designed to discern distal causes of criminality that will be 
ameliorated through benign intervention. Instead, criminal biographies are 
being employed to denote that the individuals in question have passed beyond 
the pale of acceptable behaviour. Indeed, stratagems such as the Proceeds of 
Crime legislation utilise criminal biographies initially so as facilitate the 
process of self-incrimination (the obligation is on the individual to provide 
knowledge of his/her innocence so as to unfreeze the assets); once this has been 
achieved, the relevant interim and interlocutory orders are then employed to 
neutralize the risk posed. And it is no longer the psychiatrist who embodies the 
judicial role, but the police officer whose suspicion and hunches form sufficient 
evidence for the judiciary to ratify the use of "extra-ordinary" legislation. 
For example, in the extra-ordinary realm, section 21 of the Offences 
Against the State Act, 1939 makes it an offence to be a member of an unlawful 
organisation. The relevant section does not however properly define what 
constitutes "membership" or "organisation." Moreover, a number of evidential 
techniques are permitted to provide evidence that an individual is a member of 
an unlawful organisation. Section 3 of the Offences Against the State 
(Amendment) Act, 1972 provides that evidence of oral or written statements, 
the conduct of the accused, or the opinion evidence of a Chief Superintendent in 
the Garda! may be admitted to prove membership. Section 24 of the Offences 
Against the State Act, 1939 also allows evidence of incriminating documents to 
be adduced to proof membership. Despite concerns that section 21 infringes a 
variety constitutional rights and the notion that "we are coming dangerously 
close to using the criminal law to control how an individual defines himself or 
herself,"75 the Offences Against the State Review Group endorsed the continued 
use of the provisions.76 
Recently, the Minister for Justice has suggested that he is currently 
considering inserting an additional provision into the current Criminal Justice 
Bill that will make it unlawful to be member of an organised criminal gang. No 
doubt section 21 of the Offences Against the State Act, 1939, the evidential 
provisions that surround it, and judicial interpretations that have upheld their 
constitutionality,77 will facilitate the purchase of justification (without the need 
" See Report of the Committee to Review the Offences Against the State Acts, 1939 to 1998, 
dissenting views of Professor Dermot Walsh. 
76 Report of the Committee to Review the Offences Against the State Acts, 1939 to 1998, para. 6.49. 
n See, for example, O'Leary v Attorney General [1995] I IR 254; People (Director of Public 
Prosecutions) v McCurk [1994]2 IR 579; and People (Director of Public Prosecutions) v Ferguson 
(Unreported, Court of Criminal Appeal, 31 October, 1975). 
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for any qualitative or quantitative evidence) as the provIsIon seeks public, 
legislative and judicial endorsement. All of this demonstrates, to some extent, 
the shape that policymaking takes under the culture of control: "[It] becomes a 
form of acting out that downplays the complexities and long-term character of 
effective crime control in favour of the immediate gratifications of a more 
expressive alternative. Law making becomes a matter of retaliatory gestures 
intended to reassure a worried public and to accord with common sense, however 
poorly those gestures are adapted to dealing with the underlying problem." 78 
Schmitt valorised the transformation of the rule of law into "an 
increasingly amorphous and indeterminate structure as vague legal standards 
like "in good faith" or "in the public interest", standards incompatible with 
classic liberal conceptions of the legal norm proliferated. 79 Many of his 
contemporaries were horrified by Schmitt's position as they were clear that it 
would lead to a political despotism that, in tum, led to horrors like the Holocaust. 
It is important to keep a sense of proportion and note that the parallels between 
Schmitt and contemporary political discourse are suggestive of an affinity, no 
more. We should also recognise that the rule of law can still provide a check to 
incipient authoritarianism, as the vignette below demonstrates. 
The Counterweight of Law 
A consolidated example of the normalization of extra-ordinary provisions in the 
State's attempts to combat organised crime is provided by the circumstances 
surrounding the murder of Veronica Guerin. She has become a powerfully 
symbolic figure in the fight against organized crime and her murder fuelled a 
spate of coercive legislative and Garda initiatives. Paul Ward was arrested in 
October 1996 and charged with participating in her murder. The evidence 
against him comprised verbal admissions allegedly made by him on his arrest 
under section 30 of the Offences Against the State Act 1939 and the testimony 
of Charles Bowden, an accomplice (or supergrass). Details of his detention are 
set out below to highlight the tensions that exist between the result orientated 
needs of the Gardaf as ranged against a judicial desire to uphold fairness of 
procedure principles. 
Ward was arrested and brought to Lucan Garda station in Dublin, which 
had no equipment to electronically record interviews with accuseds. On his 
arrival at the station, Ward asked to see his doctor. He did so for two reasons: 
first, to ensure that there was professional evidence to establish that at the time 
of his detention he showed no signs of physical injury; secondly, as he was a 
heroin abuser he required medication called physeptone to stave off withdrawal 
symptoms. He was then subjected to five sessions of "intense interrogation" -
comprising in total of 14~ hours - but remained silent throughout. After a visit 
from his girlfriend, however, and in what the Court described as a "remarkable 
volte face", the accused confessed to participating in the murder of Veronica 
Guerin. It also transpired that two teams of Garda interrogators again 
78 D. Garland, The Culture of Control, p. 134. 
79 W.E. Scheuremann, Between the Norm and the Exception: The Frankfurt School and the Rule of 
Law (MIT Press, 1994), p. I. 
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questioned Ward the next morning for two hours without knowing that he had 
allegedly confessed the night before. Moreover, and on the same day, the Garda 
doctor again examined the accused and found a red mark on the side of his neck 
which was not present on his initial examination. Furthermore, and again on the 
same day, Ward's 74 year old mother was brought in to see him, without either 
requesting to see the other. The Special Criminal Court found that the meetings 
of the accused with his girlfriend and mother constituted a deliberate and 
conscious breach of his constitutional right to fairness of procedures, thereby 
rendering inadmissible the alleged voluntary confession. Nonetheless, and 
despite these shortcomings, the Court convicted Ward as a result of Charles 
Bowden's testimony. The Court was also undeterred by its own belief that 
Bowden was a "self-serving, deeply avaricious and potentially vicious criminal" 
who would "lie without hesitation."80 
So what we have is evidence of a series of coercive measures employed 
in the Ward case - such as the use of terrorist legislation to detain a suspect of 
non-terrorist crime, the accused's trial in a non-jury court and, the use of 
supergrass testimony to secure his conviction - which are designed to tip the 
State-accused balance in favour of the former. More generally, we have 
witnessed how many of the initiatives aimed at combating organised crime are 
highly politicized, focus attention on victims, and are justified in part on the 
basis of their retaliatory attributes. All of this fits neatly with the culture of 
control as derived from Garland. If the analysis finishes at this point, a nice, 
compartmentalized control package can be presented - Irish style. 
But the case is also interesting for other, less dramatic, reasons. In 
particular, it should not be forgotten that the "our security depends on their 
control" mantra - as presented by Garland - has not penetrated all levels of 
State-accused relations as the liberty interests of the latter continue to be upheld 
by the Courts. In the Court of Criminal Appeal, and reversing the decision of 
the Special Criminal Court, the conviction and sentence of Ward were set aside 
on the ground of the difficulty - in the absence of corroboration - of ensuring 
the integrity of Bowden's testimony.81 
In the appeal judgment, we find the Irish judiciary driving a wedge 
between result-orientated State needs and the individual liberty interests of the 
accused. In coming down in favour of the latter in the Ward case, it 
demonstrates the continued potential of the judiciary to resist, in part, the 
controlling, retaliatory tendencies of contemporary criminal justice. Of course, 
it is just potential and one should remain alive to the possibility that the liberty 
interests of accuseds are also capable of manipulation by the judiciary. Legal 
rights and concepts, as Critical Legal Studies scholars constantly remind us, are 
"flippable." This is, to some extent, borne out in an analysis of the Ward case. 
The Special Criminal Court, perhaps smelling guilt, was ambivalent about the 
accused's legal rights vis-a-vis the testimony of Charles Bowden. Nonetheless, 
and bearing this caution in mind, these juridical details - albeit less dramatic -
must also be factored into any analysis of the Irish penal landscape as it relates 
to the culture of control. Such details can help us see a possibility beyond a 
penal dystopia in which the exception becomes the norm. 
W (Unreported, Special Criminal Court, 27 November. 1998). 
81 See (Court of Criminal Appeal, Unreported, March 22, 2002). 
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Conclusion 
[reland is currently being exposed to many of the indicia of change identified by 
Garland in his Culture of Control thesis. Many of these phenomena, however, 
are occurring at a surface level and it is far too early to say whether or not they 
are constitutive of new master strategy of control. Nonetheless, one domain of 
the Irish criminal justice system where a discernible reconfiguration is taking 
place is in the priority assigned to due process values and considerations. This 
reconfiguration, which permeates extensively, demonstrates many "culture of 
control" characteristics. The process whereby accused and offender rights are 
curtailed, for example, is highly politicized; expands the powers of the 
"sovereign" in the criminal arena; is designed to reassure a worried public that 
it is not being governed by a "can't do anything, won't do anything brigade"; 
prioritises public protection above all other competing demands; and relies 
upon vapid, justificatory mantras such as "the innocent have nothing to fear." 
This deprioritisation of due process values in Ireland has however, in 
part, a different causal flow to that adumbrated by Garland. As noted, Ireland 
has a long history of relying on extraordinary powers to combat the threat posed 
by paramilitarism on the island. This tradition of invoking extra-ordinary laws 
and creating special zones where normal laws do not apply has facilitated the 
rapid advance of a crime control model of justice. The normalization of these 
special zones has been achieved through inter alia a criminology of the "extra-
ordinary" which seeks to accentuate the public security parallels that 
supposedly exist between paramilitaries and particular groupings of ordinary 
"folk-devil" criminals. Such metaphorical and dramaturgical parallels can by 
and large be defined by a paucity of supporting details. This absence of a 
scintilla of convincing evidence to support the parallels being drawn, or the 
justifications being purchased, has not however, and as we have seen, curtailed 
efforts to dismantle the "equality of arms" values that traditionally existed 
between the state and accuseds. Indeed the reconfiguration has occurred in an 
environment where the public has become habituated to the employment of a 
crime control model of justice for paramilitaries and amenable - however 
fragile the evidence - to a similar instrumental logic of repression on the 
grounds of security being employed in the ordinary sphere. More and more 
ordinary groupings of accuseds have been assimilated into the special zones 
where normal laws do not apply. At the same time the "normal" laws 
themselves, which increasingly only apply to low risk groups of offenders and 
accuseds, are being unconditionally championed as evidence of our unceasing 
commitment to civil liberties, human rights and due process concerns.82 It 
82 For example, in April 2003, the Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform, Michael McDowell, 
could suggest that Ireland was the only "member-state of the EU in which individual citizens are 
guaranteed the constitutional right to due process, exclusion of illegally obtained evidence, to trial by 
jury in all non-minor cases, to fair bail, to the presumption of innocence, to habeas corpus, and the right 
to have any law invalidated in the courts which conflicts with his or her rights and the right not to have 
any of these rights altered except by referendum'. The Irish Times 24 April, 2003. That such a claim 
- so reflective of the "benign pretensions" vista which Garland now believes to be passe - could be 
made despite the "radical re-alignment" which has taken place is reflective of the State's ability to "pay 
homage to certain ideals" whilst "fashioning a structure more closely wedded" to its own perceived needs. 
See C. Fennell, Crime and Crisis in Ireland: Justice by Illusion. (Cork University Press, 1993), p. 8. 
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remains to be seen if the law itself, and particularly the values enshrined in the 
Constitution, can act as a counterpoint to this rising tide of crime control - as 
witnessed in the Court of Criminal Appeal decision in Ward. But given that 
"judicial imprimatur" has already been given to some elements of the crime 
control model of justice in Ireland, as witnessed in Quilligan, this is by no 
means a forgone conclusion. 
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